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Abstract Understanding managerial behavior and its underlying motivations is
of key interest in times where the role of business in society is generally viewed
critically. While CEO influence on strategy making processes is almost undisputed,
little attention has explicitly been paid to how CEO values and the characteristics
of the top management team (TMT) interact in shaping corporate strategy making.
This is surprising if one follows the assumption that top managers who work closely
together will by necessity influence each other’s actions. Hence, we would expect the
CEO-TMT interface to be vital in understanding how leadership influences strategy
making. To address this, we propose a model in which the personal values of the CEO
have a direct effect on the characteristics of corporate strategy making processes yet
where this association is moderated by TMT diversity. We test the model with
data from Austria and Germany obtained through a large-scale survey conducted in
spring 2015 and a follow-up survey conducted in fall 2015 and find general support
for our model. CEO values geared towards self-transcendence (as opposed to self-
interest) seem to be associated with more formal strategy making processes, while
values geared towards openness to change (as opposed to conservation) are found
to be associated with more flexible and less externally open ones. TMT diversity
moderates all of these relationships. Our results add to upper echelon theory as well
as to strategy process research and highlight promising avenues for future research.
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1 Introduction
Understanding how executives shape the corporations they work for is, in essence,
vital for all organizational science (Hambrick and Quigley 2014). While the interest
in how the personal characteristics of leaders and leadership teams influence the
workings of corporations1 can be traced back at least to the origins of upper echelon
theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984), curiosity regarding the motivations behind
these influences has arguably increased in recent years. This is partly due to business
scandals, and the resulting quest for more responsible leadership (Maak 2007) and
partly because the role of business in society is generally viewed more critically
today than it was in the past (Carter and Greer 2013). The increased interest is
highlighted in a multitude of recent contributions in renowned publications (e. g.
Six et al. 2013; Wowak et al. 2016; Hambrick and Quigley 2014).
Many important relationships have been uncovered between (individual and team)
leadership characteristics, such as personality factors (Peterson et al. 2003), political
orientation or personal values (Chin et al. 2013), and different outcome variables,
such as performance (Ling et al. 2007; Hambrick and Quigley 2014), innovative-
ness (Lefebvre and Lefebvre 1992; Ahn et al. 2013), corporate social responsibility
(Hemingway and Maclagan 2004) or corporate strategy in general (Gupta 1984;
Miller and Toulouse 1986). These findings have greatly enhanced our understanding
of how organizations work. But they have also by no means been uniform, particu-
larly with regard to top management team (TMT) effects. This is due in part to the
underlying complexity: TMT diversity could, for example, improve organizational
performance because of the larger skill pool available or hamper it because of team
fragmentation or lack of behavioral integration (Buyl et al. 2011). Excellent sum-
maries of upper echelon studies and theories (e. g. Carpenter et al. 2004; Nielsen
2010) exist, and while this paper does not attempt to provide another compendium
of findings, we do see several shortcomings that need to be addressed.
First, much of the prior upper echelon research uses performance as an outcome
variable. We believe that studies which relate leadership to financial performance are
unsatisfying as they fail to address the processes by which this relationship actually
unfolds. While some of these processes have been explored, only a few have received
sound empirical attention (Peterson et al. 2003). We argue that part of the reason
for the equivocal results of past research into leadership characteristics (Kisfalvi
and Pitcher 2003) lies precisely in the focus on outcomes that are fairly distal to
the CEO, such as performance (Wowak et al. 2016; Hambrick and Quigley 2014).
Of course, not all upper echelon research uses performance as the dependent vari-
1 We use the terms corporation, firm and organization, by which we mean large firms/corporations/
organizations, interchangeably in this paper.
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able; relationships to proximate outcome variables (e. g. strategic dynamism) have
also been analyzed and proved to be significant (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007).
However, almost none (with a few notable exceptions like Miller et al. (1998), who
relate TMT diversity to strategic decision making or already mentioned Wowak et al.
(2016), who look at effects of CEO charisma on strategic change) use the strategy
making process itself as the outcome variable. This lack of attention is surprising
given that this process describes “how managers can continuously influence the
quality of the firm’s strategic position” (Chakravarthy and Doz 1992). Understand-
ing how leadership characteristics influence strategy making processes would seem
to us to be vital for comprehending why these processes are structured the way they
are and what characteristics are needed to continuously adapt organizations to fast
changing environments.
Second, interaction effects have likewise not received adequate attention. Some
past studies have analyzed and found various CEO characteristics to be impor-
tant determinants of organizational outcomes (e. g. Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007).
Others have looked at how the characteristics of TMTs (especially diversity) influ-
ence strategically relevant decisions (e. g. Hambrick et al. 1996). Despite the vast
knowledge about the influence of leadership on organizations that these studies have
produced, we are still somewhat puzzled by the fact that there have been only limited
attempts to explicitly investigate how the characteristics of the TMT and the person-
ality of the CEO interact and jointly shape strategic outcomes. After all, it would
seem logical that the interactions between executives who work closely together by
necessity influence their individual actions. Hence, to understand the influence of
one particular person, interaction effects need to be taken into account. The few
studies that have been conducted in this regard show promising results. Buyl et al.
(2011), for example, analyze how CEO functional diversity interacts with TMT di-
versity in shaping organizational performance and postulate that having a generalist
CEO partly substitutes for TMT functional diversity. Peterson et al. (2003), on the
other hand, investigate how the personality of the CEO influences TMT group dy-
namics and find support for interaction effects on organizational performance. They
also affirm the link between personality and organizational outcomes and call for
more research to specifically explore the CEO-TMT interface. Finally, Papadakis
and Barwise (2002) explore how CEO and TMT characteristics influence strate-
gic decisions in Greek firms. While their results suggest that context matters most,
they also submit that analyzing the influences of the CEO and the TMT jointly in
upper echelon studies would provide a more reliable description of the underlying
processes and dynamics. So, while these studies demonstrate the presence of inter-
actions, none of them relate CEO-TMT interactions to a comprehensive model of
strategy making.
Third, when people justify their intended behavior, they usually refer to their val-
ues (Roccas et al. 2002). This arguably makes these the most interesting subject of
study when it comes to understanding managerial behavior. Yet in prior upper ech-
elon research, values have mostly been assessed using proxies (e. g. demographics).
Recent research questions the validity of this approach, with some researchers even
calling for “[...] a moratorium on the use of demographic variables as surrogates for
psychosocial constructs” (Boal and Hooijberg 2001, p. 523). We believe that there
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are advantages to using self-reported values over inferring them from observable
characteristics. Any inference from observable action can always only be a second-
best guess. This applies especially for values that do not necessarily produce mea-
surable actions and only guide behavior in a given situation. Accordingly, it could
well be the case that two people with the same value systems act differently because
they face different constraints (Schwartz 1994). Similar debates on self-reported
psychological constructs have taken place in other disciplines (such as happiness re-
search), where much attention has been devoted to testing the validity of self-reports,
predominantly with positive results (Layard and Layard 2011). Nonetheless, using
self-reported data does carry risks, such as construct validity or measurement error.
However, since we use a widely-tested scale and follow best practice in our data
collection, we believe that we have minimized these risks in our study. Furthermore,
many of the possible drawbacks of using self-reported data are actually also present
when using non-self-reported data (Chan 2009). We thus believe that our study puts
us in a position to find more accurate explanations of CEO effects.
All in all, the above arguments constitute a call for a comprehensive interaction
model. In response, we thus investigate the individual and joint effects of CEO values
and TMT diversity on the characteristics of corporate strategy making processes.
We position our paper at the intersection between upper echelon theory and strategy
process research and consistently root it primarily in these two streams of literature.
We deliberately chose the strategy making process as our outcome variable, since we
feel that (a) the CEO has sufficient discretion to influence this process directly, and
(b) the strategy making process itself has an important effect on corporate strategies
and hence on performance (Hart and Banbury 1994; Covin et al. 2006; Baum and
Wally 2003). We consider studying the influence of such personal values on a process
outcome to be of key interest at a time like the present where responsible leadership
is increasingly called for (Maak 2007), profit maximization is decreasingly seen as
the only purpose of a firm (Carter and Greer 2013) and fast-changing environments
require firms to continuously engage in self-renewal (Doz and Kosonen 2008).
For the purposes of this paper, we model the characteristics of the strategy mak-
ing process along four dimensions derived from pre-existing frameworks and some
very recent research, namely centralization, formalization, flexibility and external
openness. Our data stems from a large-scale survey of CEOs in Austria and Ger-
many carried out in early 2015 and a follow-up survey conducted with a secondary
respondent in each corporation in fall 2015. Our hypothesized model claims that
CEO values directly shape the corporate strategy making process and hence deter-
mine its characteristics. We also argue that higher levels of TMT diversity mitigate
the association between CEO personal values and the characteristics of the strategy
making process.
Our analysis of this data shows no support for the hypothesized model on a very
high order level of strategy making process characterization (i. e. centralization vs.
decentralization), yet does indicate some support for the model on a lower level of
strategy making process characterization (formalization, flexibility, external open-
ness), where the data backs most of our hypotheses. We can observe, for instance,
that the values of CEOs geared towards self-transcendence seem to be associated
with more formal strategy making processes, while those of CEOs geared towards
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openness to change appear to be linked with strategy processes that are more flexible
yet less open to external stakeholders. In our model, more TMT diversity negatively
moderates the association between CEO values and the strategy making process,
which supports our interaction hypothesis.
Our paper thus adds to upper echelon theory and strategy process research alike.
One of its main contributions lies in its integration of research on CEO-TMT inter-
action with an explicit treatment of values. We thus build on the sparse interaction
papers outlined above and add a further nuance to upper echelon research, namely
the notion that TMT diversity negatively moderates CEO influence on corporate
outcomes. We also blend existing, comprehensive strategy making frameworks and
add the very topical concept of external openness, thus contributing to strategy pro-
cess research. In doing so, our paper provides a starting point for further research
into the relationship between open strategy and other strategy process characteris-
tics. Finally, we relate the two previous topics and test the model in a large-scale
survey. The support we find for some of our hypotheses lends further emphasis to
the above arguments. Overall, the paper contributes to our understanding of how
and why CEOs structure strategy processes in certain ways and provide avenues for
future research, particularly with regard to external openness.
2 Background, Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 The Strategy Making Process
There are a number of definitions for the strategy making process. Chakravarthy
and Doz (1992) describe it as “how effective strategies are shaped within the firm
and then validated and implemented efficiently”. Referring to the diversity of strat-
egy process research, Van de Ven (1992) argues that it can hardly be subsumed
under a single paradigm and calls for the use of very explicit process definitions. He
suggests three meanings of process: (1) a logic that explains causal relationships be-
tween independent and dependent variables, (2) a category of concepts that refers to
actions of individuals or groups of individuals, and (3) a sequence of events that de-
scribes how things change over time. Pettigrew (1997) builds on this third definition
and adds a number of premises to the study of strategy making processes, foremost
the importance of temporal and contextual interconnectedness. Following this line
of thought, and given that it is shaped by (also changing) people, a strategy making
process is not a static ‘thing’ that a corporation has, but rather an eclectic process,
which is itself subject to change in the long run. Each corporation will at a given
point in time have a strategy process that features certain characteristics. These char-
acteristics then constitute a dynamic organizational capability (Hutzschenreuter and
Kleindienst 2006). The fact that they can be knowingly changed makes them an
interesting topic of research. In fact, many different such characterizations—which
Dess et al. (1997) refer to as “gestalts”—have been proposed. In this paper, we
take the strategy making process to include all actions of individuals and groups of
individuals that lead a firm to obtain, advance and alter its strategy. We also focus
explicitly on the characteristics of strategy making processes. We assess these along
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the four dimensions mentioned above, which we see situated on two different levels
(a classification which we will elaborate upon in the following paragraphs).
The first of these previous strategy making frameworks we briefly want to high-
light is proposed by Dess et al. (1997) and builds on four different factors, which
they label participative, entrepreneurial, adaptive and simplistic. They focus, how-
ever, on the entrepreneurial strategy making mode, i. e. a pro-active, partly risky
and innovation-first approach, which they consider to be well suited to addressing
the challenges of a fast-paced world. In their opinion, an entrepreneurial firm is the
opposite of a conservative one. They do, however, also note that “[...] environmental
challenges and organizational complexities [...] suggest that simple relationships may
be inadequate to explain the relationship between entrepreneurial strategy making
and performance” (Dess et al. 1997, p. 678).
Following on from other frameworks (with more dimensions) that they had pro-
posed as early as 1978, Miller and Friesen (1983) define two strategy making di-
mensions, namely analysis and innovation. The former focuses on the number of
factors that are taken into account for decision making, how well different decisions
are integrated and the extent to which future contingencies are included. The latter
deals with the amount of effort that is directed to the development of new prod-
ucts and/or services and how proactively and flexibly the corporation approaches
strategic decisions. Miller and Friesen argue and show that firms must adapt their
strategy making to the respective environment (which they again classify according
to a number of categories).
In addition to his well-known distinction between planned and emergent strate-
gies, Mintzberg also proposes several modes of strategy making, including the plan-
ning, adaptive, entrepreneurial and bargaining modes. These are defined in line with
the roles that formal analysis, stakeholder concerns, interactions between multiple
decision makers and opportunity/risk taking play in strategy formulation (Mintzberg
1978, 1973, 1983).
Probably one of the most comprehensive characterizations of strategy making
to date is, however, the one proposed by Hart (1992), who endeavors to bring
structure into the “model proliferation” (Hart 1992) that had resulted from the nu-
merous typologies proposed over the years. He argues that the range of approaches
that had emerged was so wide that little cumulative knowledge had in fact re-
sulted. Hart builds on many previously suggested classifications and identifies the
relevant and recurring themes as rationality (bounded vs. comprehensive), vision
(where and how does it originate?) and involvement (i. e. who plays what role in
the process?). Arguing that each of the previously suggested classifications only
captures a portion of strategy making, he develops a comprehensive framework
built around the role played by top management and other members of the orga-
nization in the development of strategy. This framework consists of five pure-type
strategy styles—command, symbolic, rational, transactive and generative—each of
which describes a mode of strategy making. In a command mode, for instance,
the TMT formulates strategy top down, and organizational members implement it.
In contrast, a generative mode of strategy making relies on central guidelines and
intrapreneurship to produce innovation bottom up. Hart treats these styles as non-
rival and contends that an ability to master multiple styles has positive performance
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implications, whereas single modes of strategy making are really only successful
in turbulent environments where the need for fast processes outpaces deep capabil-
ities (Hart and Banbury 1994). Hart’s ideas are also taken up by Andersen (2004,
2009), who go a step further and argue that most strategy making typologies capture
(de-)centralization as a dominant process characteristic.
In order to relate the individual characteristics of strategy making processes to
those of leadership and to account for some very recent research trends a slight
reconfiguration of the previous strategy making frameworks is wanted. As a starting
point, we concur with almost all of the previous research (Hart 1992; Andersen
2004; Floyd and Lane 2000) on the central importance of the respective roles of
top management, middle management and operative personnel in strategy making
which addresses Hart’s (1992) involvement theme. We label this the (de-)central-
ization dimension. Decentralization can occur on either a hierarchical, functional
or geographic level or, indeed, as a combination of the three. Further components
include the level of participation in decisions and decision authority accorded to
the respective groups, both of which contribute (albeit in different ways) to decen-
tralized strategy making (Andersen 2004). Decentralization is arguably the highest-
order characteristic of strategy making in a firm.
In our opinion, there are three further dimensions which are subordinate to the
level of decentralization in strategy making. The first of these, formalization, relates
specifically to how well strategy making routines are established and codified and
the extent to which medium- to long-term planning is emphasized within the firm
(Ansoff 1980; Hart and Banbury 1994; Falshaw et al. 2006). It describes the level of
formal analysis that a firm practices in its strategy formulation process. Furthermore,
a formal strategy making process is also likely to be a procedure that occurs in
regular cycles. This addresses in particular the rationality theme identified both by
Hart (1992) and as early as 1963 by Cyert and March.
The second such dimension, namely flexibility, relates to the extent to which
processes and the underlying assumptions behind established routines would be
challenged should the respective environment change (Sharfman and Dean 1997).
It also incorporates how well a corporation is able to accommodate new ideas
and approaches (e. g. emergent strategies) from within (Mintzberg 1978, 1994).
This dimension thus addresses the top-down vs. bottom-up theme (jointly with
decentralization) and ties in with the discussion surrounding the entrepreneurial
orientation of firms. The importance of (a lack of) flexibility becomes particularly
evident in the analysis of firms which failed in times of major changes in their
environments (Doz and Kosonen 2008).
The final dimension is external openness, which itself combines two distinct con-
cepts, namely stakeholder engagement and open strategy. Stakeholder engagement
is the extent to which stakeholder interests are considered in the formulation of
the strategy (Freeman et al. 2010). Open strategy (Whittington et al. 2011; Matzler
et al. 2014) relates to how far external stakeholders (such as universities, customers
or NGOs) are given an active role in the strategy making process—a concept with
close ties to open innovation practices (Laursen and Salter 2006). While the other
three dimensions (decentralization, formalization and flexibility) feature directly in
previously suggested frameworks, external openness has so far been more or less
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neglected. Technological possibilities such as crowdsourcing platforms and online
communities have, however, greatly facilitated the adoption of more open approaches
in recent years. It therefore comes as no surprise that several experts, including Ches-
brough and Appleyard (2007), have pointed to a number of anomalies in the closed-
strategy approach and to the inevitability of a paradigm shift towards a more open
approach. The recently established academic interest in open strategy seems to prove
their point and warrants this additional dimension in our strategy making framework.
These four dimensions are non-rival, non-exclusive and all present simultane-
ously—albeit to differing extents—in a single corporation. They characterize strat-
egy making for a specific corporation. All in all, we believe that our framework,
which both recombines and adds to existing models, provides a comprehensive ac-
count of all relevant dimensions of strategy making. Furthermore, because it treats
these dimensions separately and does not summarize them in strategy making “char-
acters”, it provides the perfect basis for relating them to leadership characteristics.
2.2 Upper Echelon Theory and Personal Values
The idea behind upper echelon theory can be traced back to both the behavioral
theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963), which argued that managers do not
always make rational choices, as well as to the notion that managers possess certain
‘givens’, which affect how they make certain decisions (March and Simon 1958).
Hence, managers are fundamentally influenced by natural human limitations, such as
bounded rationality, and by their own personal characteristics and cognitive biases.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) took this as their starting point and developed a model
of how managers’ personal characteristics influence strategic choice. They referred
to this model as “upper echelon theory”. In this model, the so-called cognitive base
and personal values act like a filter and lead to what Hambrick and Mason refer
to as a limited field of vision. In this limited field of vision, managers still only
notice what is relevant to them; Hambrick and Mason label this selective percep-
tion. Finally, managers interpret the perceived situation based on their respective
‘givens’. The characteristics that guide the selective perception and interpretation of
situations can be classified into psychological factors (values, cognitive base) and
observable characteristics (age, education, culture of socialization, experience, etc.).
Upper echelon theory differs from the general behavioral theory of the firm in its
explicit focus on the characteristics of the TMT rather than on those of the individual
executive (Tacheva 2007).
For Hambrick and Mason (1984), the TMT is the dominant coalition in an organi-
zation, i. e. its most powerful executives. While conceptually correct, this definition
cannot be easily applied in practice, and we have therefore chosen to stick to the
definition used in more recent reviews (e. g. Nielsen 2010), which describe the TMT
as top executives who report directly to the CEO. Research into TMTs accords con-
siderable attention to diversity—not just because of the high diversity in TMTs that
has resulted from increased global mobility but also because diversity can have pro-
found organizational outcomes (Tacheva 2007). TMT diversity is most commonly
defined as the distribution of personal attributes among the members of the TMT
(Nielsen 2010; Jackson et al. 2003).
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Multiple constructs can be used in conjunction with diversity, namely separa-
tion, variety and disparity. Diversity as separation means differences in opinions
or positions and describes distance along a single continuum. Diversity as variety
represents differences in knowledge, experience and so forth. Finally, diversity as
disparity represents differences in pay or social assets. Like most other studies, we
use a ‘diversity as variety’ definition across multiple categories for our study (see
the section on methodology for a discussion of the variables used in our survey). We
also acknowledge that a large body of literature has emerged (particularly in recent
years) which investigates the micro-processes that constitute the actual connection
between diversity and organizational outcomes such as intra-team processes. While
some of this research argues that the diversity concept is too general to infer mean-
ingful conclusions, it still enjoys wide support from the upper echelon community.
However, since a full discussion of all these debates would go beyond the scope
of this paper, we will restrict ourselves here to referring the reader to the many
excellent existing reviews of this matter (e. g. Nielsen 2010).
Turning our focus explicitly to personal values takes us to a widely-researched
field. Personal values have been shown to be important factors in determining (na-
tional) culture (Schwartz and Bilsky 1990; Schwartz and Sagiv 1995; Hofstede
1984), organizational culture (Schein 2009) as well as particular fields of strate-
gic action, first and foremost in the stakeholder engagement and corporate social
responsibility domains (Agle et al. 1999; Kaldschmidt 2011). Prior studies even
show indirect links between values and corporate performance (Berson et al. 2008).
A value system is an organization of beliefs relating to a preferred mode of conduct
or end-state. Values are enduring, yet not fixed, and therefore different from personal
traits (Rokeach 1973). While traits describe how people are, values describe what
they deem good, what they see as desirable. Values are what people usually refer to
when they justify actions and behaviors. In essence, traits are enduring dispositions,
and values are enduring goals. Traits vary in the frequency and intensity of their
presence; values vary in the relative importance attributed to them and thus serve
as guiding principles (Roccas et al. 2002). Traits are also largely immune to envi-
ronmental and social influences (e. g. education), while values are not (Olver and
Mooradian 2003). According to McCrae and Costa (1996), traits like the five factors
(one of the most common personality frameworks) are only the “raw materials” of
personality, while values are concrete characteristic adaptations, habits, attitudes,
etc. While traits guide an individual’s behavior individually, it is the overall arrange-
ment of their values, i. e. a person’s overall value system, that determines how they
interpret certain situations and hence how they choose to act. Values and traits are by
no means independent of each other. Indeed, it has been argued that they can develop
in parallel, i. e. that people may adjust their value systems to fit their traits, and that
value priorities can induce behaviors that are then perceived as traits. Ultimately,
we chose to use values in our study because the evidence points towards traits have
a stronger influence on behavior over which individuals have little cognitive control,
whereas values have more effect on behavior they can voluntarily control (Roccas
et al. 2002)—and strategy making processes are closer to the latter than the former.
While numerous theoretical frameworks exist for values (e. g. Hofstede 1984;
Rokeach 1973; Inglehart 2004), the most widely used system, particularly in
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Fig. 1 Schwartz Value Circum-
plex (Schwartz 1994)
management research, is the Schwartz Value System (Schwartz and Bilsky 1990;
Schwartz 1992). This was developed on the basis of the ideas put forward by
Rokeach and presented in a seminal article in the anthology Advances in Exper-
imental Social Psychology (Schwartz 1992), which has received more than 9000
citations to date. The system has been tested and verified using more than 200
samples from over 60 countries and continues to be widely applied in business
and social research, for instance in the biennial European Social Survey (ESS),
where it is used to measure the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of diverse
populations in more than 30 nations. The Schwartz Value System is based on the
notion that values (a) are beliefs, (b) are a motivational construct, (c) transcend
specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation, and (e) are ordered by relative
importance. The framework consists of ten basic values, namely self-direction,
stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benev-
olence and universalism (see Appendix for a more detailed description). These
ten values are arranged in a circular manner (see Fig. 1) in recognition of their
competing nature. This means that actions that are guided by one value may be
in conflict or in accordance with other values. As Fig. 1 shows, the closer the
motivational goals of two or more values, the more they correlate empirically and
the more closely they are located in the circular representation (Roccas et al. 2002).
The ten basic values in the Schwartz Value System can also be grouped into two
basic dimensions on orthogonal axes, thereby depicting two fundamental human
problems which require resolution (Rohan 2000). The respective values upon which
these basic dimensions are built can also be seen in Fig. 1. The first of these two
dimensions is openness to change vs. conservation (i. e. enhancement of the status
quo by following intellectual and emotional interests vs. preservation of the status
quo for various reasons, e. g. tradition). The second dimension is self-transcendence
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
vs. self-enhancement (i. e. concern for the welfare of others and society vs. self-
interest) (Lindeman and Verkasalo 2005). This type of focus on higher-order values
is useful because it allows us to compare whole values systems in relation to an
external variable instead of concentrating on single values at an individual level
(Schwartz, 1996 quoted from Kaldschmidt 2011). This recognizes the fact that
opposing values are activated in the face of moral decision making, which can lead
to ethical dilemmas (Watson et al. 2009). In such cases, a decision will then often
be taken based on the importance attributed to any of the relevant competing values
(Schwartz 2013). Since such moral decisions clearly feature in everyday managerial
work, these values are highly important for understanding the behavior of managers.
2.3 Hypotheses
Values influence the strategy making process in multiple ways (Hambrick and Bran-
don 1988). Prominent in upper echelon theory, for instance, is the notion that the
personal values held by CEOs will influence their decisions by shaping their inter-
pretations of a situation and acting like a filter for environmental stimuli (Hambrick
and Mason 1984). Arguably, decisions on how to structure a corporation’s strategy
process are—like other strategic decisions—dependent on situational interpretations.
The conscious transfer of values to the organization is a second way in which they
can exert an influence. A characteristic of values is that their holders view them
as favorable. Executives thus imprint their own values onto their organization by
means of their decisions (Berson et al. 2008). Internal processes are one clear man-
ifestation of decisions. In other words, the ethical orientation of an organization, for
example, is revealed through the formal and explicit processes it uses in its day-to-
day activities (Hood 2003; Carlson and Perrewe 1995). We can also expect values
to have an indirect effect through employees, since CEOs are likely to—knowingly
or unwittingly—project and communicate their own values onto their employees
either directly or by acting as a role-model, thereby encouraging or discouraging
particular behaviors and behavioral patterns (Schein 2010). In the strategy making
context, a corresponding behavioral pattern would, for instance, be the voicing of
individual ideas by employees, which might be welcome to a greater or lesser extent
in a corporation. The resulting environment also shapes and constitutes an important
part of the respective corporation’s strategy making process (Burgelman 1996).
As mentioned above, we focus in our study on two prime value dimensions from
which a number of behavioral tendencies follow. A value system geared towards
self-transcendence (as opposed to self-enhancement) means that the well-being of
others is given a high priority and drives the importance attached to environmental
protection and equality. People with high self-transcendence values tend to be more
tolerant and less concerned about social status, control and dominance over others
(Roccas 2003). In contrast, the holder of a value system geared towards openness to
change (as opposed to conservation) places great importance on independent action
and shows little concern for the status quo. Such people are, for example, unlikely
to be strong proponents of tradition and/or religion (Kaldschmidt 2011). As we will
explain below, these behavioral tendencies also materialize in more specific ways
when viewed in the strategy making context.
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The first and highest-level dimension of strategy making we would like to relate
to values is decentralization, which many previous frameworks identify as one of
the most important dimensions of strategy making (Andersen 2004). Decentralized
organizational designs by necessity imply more people having stakes in decisions
and thus more opinions on the table at any given time. CEOs with a value sys-
tem geared more towards openness to change are comfortable with letting different
opinions surface and are open to allowing people on lower levels to take decisions
without having prior knowledge themselves of where these might lead (Sashkin
1988). Such values have also been found to be positively correlated with more risk-
seeking personalities (Roccas et al. 2002). Lewin and Stephens (1994), for example,
argue that managers who are more risk-averse are more likely to implement more
centralized organizational designs, because such setups are characterized by high
levels of control and supervision to minimize uncertainty and reduce surprises. We
would thus expect to see a positive relationship between openness to change and
decentralization. On the other hand, people whose value systems tend more towards
self-transcendence (as opposed to self-interest) are less concerned about “making
a mark” for themselves, have less need to improve their social status and less de-
sire to influence the context in which they operate (Papadakis 2006). More self-
transcendence values also imply that more weight is placed upon equality (Roccas
2003). CEOs with such values seek to design organizations and strategy processes
with only minimal power differences and would thus be expected to adopt a very
decentralized design in their strategy processes (Lewin and Stephens 1994). Con-
versely, more pronounced self-enhancement values have been shown to lead to more
centralized organizational designs: the more CEOs are driven by self-enhancement
and achievement values, the more need they will feel to be personally and directly
responsible for success. This is only achievable in more centralized structures (Miller
and Droege 1986). These findings have also been partly replicated in recent research
(Papadakis 2006). Accordingly, we should expect to see an association between self-
transcendence values and decentralization.
H1a: CEO values more oriented towards openness to change are associated with
higher scores for decentralization
H1b: CEO values more oriented towards self-transcendence are associated with
higher scores for decentralization
Formalization is the dimension that is most closely related to rationality (Hart
1992) and the so-called planning school of strategy making (Ansoff 1965). It implies
written rules and procedures (e. g. job descriptions), thorough data collection and
in-depth analyses prior to decisions as well as sophisticated control mechanisms
(Wally and Baum 1994). These rules and procedures limit the amount of personal
power that can be projected onto the organization and how far an organizational
design can be adapted to suit one’s own personal needs. If procedures in an organi-
zation are more formalized, agendas guided purely by self-interest, be they illegal
or not, have less potential to succeed. Similarly, there is less chance of a position of
power being abused. Unsurprisingly, research shows that more advanced governance
mechanisms reduce the probability of accounting scandals and indeed of fraud in
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general (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Farber 2005). Accordingly, we would expect
CEOs with more pronounced self-enhancement values (which are augmented by
power values) to build less formalized organizations. Vice versa, we would expect
CEOs with more pronounced self-transcendence values to implement more formal-
ized strategy making processes in order to ensure that self-interest agendas are kept
to a minimum.
If CEOs have a value system that is oriented more towards self-interest, they are
also more likely to assume similar value systems in other members of their organi-
zation. Guth and MacMillan (1986) investigated the link between self-interest and
middle management strategy implementation and found that if a strategic initiative
threatens their self-interest agendas of middle management at risk, they are more
likely to create substantial obstacles to its implementation. It thus seems reasonable
to assume that managers who expect their subordinates to be guided by self-interest
agendas will implement formal mechanisms that ensure compliance with top-down
agendas. Conversely, Lewin and Stephens (1994) suggest that managers who exhibit
a high level of trust in the good of people feel little need to monitor employees and
thus tend to implement fewer formal control and governance mechanisms. These
arguments lead us to the following hypothesis:
H2: CEO values more oriented towards self-transcendence are associated with
higher scores for formalization
CEOs with stronger openness to change values tend to attribute less importance
to the status quo or to established routines and behavioral norms (Schwartz 1992).
Hence, they could be expected to depart more frequently from the status quo and
encourage more flexible strategy making processes—an expectation that is backed up
by some very recent research (Wowak et al. 2016). Likewise, and as outlined above,
openness to change values are associated with greater tolerance for risk (Roccas
et al. 2002). People with such values have fewer reservations regarding ambiguity.
While flexibility in strategy making is not necessarily a high-risk approach, it does
require the challenging of previously held assumptions. If the latter relate to the very
foundations of the workings of the corporation, it would seem safe to assume that
challenging them increases ambiguity.
A flexible strategy making process also facilitates the integration of en-
trepreneurial, emergent and bottom-up strategic initiatives into overall corporate
strategy. Many authors, including Burgelman (1983), have suggested that top-down,
induced strategic initiatives produce little variation to the existing course of action
and that it is the more bottom-up, autonomous activities that bring about major
changes. Since CEOs with more pronounced openness to change values can be
expected to be more welcoming of (or even demanding) such changes, it seems
likely that they would implement strategy making processes that afford the necessary
flexibility. In contrast, we explicitly do not expect a negative association between
openness to change and formalization, since the latter does not, in our view, prohibit
or prevent the former. Indeed, formalization that is “done well” might even increase
information flows and speed up strategic decisions (Baum and Wally 2003) and thus
be an additional driver of flexibility.
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H3: CEO values more oriented towards openness to change are associated with
higher scores for flexibility
When a strategy making process is more externally open, stakeholders outside
the firm are included in strategy formulation. This is achieved either by considering
their interests (stakeholder engagement) (Freeman et al. 2010) and/or by actively
engaging them in the process (Matzler et al. 2014). The logic behind externally
open strategy making is simple: since there are more people outside a firm than
within, the population of non-firm members must by default have more ideas than
the firm members. A paradigm shift has taken place in this respect, and while strategy
making used to be elitist and secret (Williamson 1970), more and more firms are now
stepping beyond open innovation and seeking to harvest the potential of openness
in their strategy making endeavors as well (Dobusch et al. 2015). However, more
external openness also means that more opinions will be voiced (Whittington et al.
2011), and a firm thus willingly submits itself to these by being more transparent
and/or inclusive. This means that it has to consider more alternative options, some of
which will undoubtedly deviate from its current course of action. We would expect
CEOs with value systems more oriented towards openness to change to foster such
strategy making processes, since they are the ones who will recognize the greatest
benefit in such alternative options. Hence, we would also expect to see a positive
association between CEO values geared towards openness to change and the external
openness of strategy making. In fact, similar results have already been reported.
Ahn et al. (2013), for example, identified certain CEO traits, like risk-taking and
entrepreneurial orientation, that are positively related to open innovation practices.
The argument we have previously framed with respect to higher levels of flexibility
inducing higher levels of ambiguity (which people with less tolerance for risk try to
avoid) can also be transferred to external openness. Here too, more openness should
be associated with higher levels of ambiguity (not least because of the potential for
information and idea leakage), lending further support to the hypothesis that more
openness to change values should be associated with more external openness.
H4: CEO values more oriented towards openness to change are associated with
higher scores for external openness
CEOs can influence their corporations through their ability to exercise discretion
(Hemingway and Maclagan 2004). The more discretion they have, the more they
will imprint their values on the firm by designing processes according to what they
view as ‘good’. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1987, 1990) identify three factors that
determine discretion, namely the degree to which the environment allows change,
the degree to which the organization itself can accommodate change and the extent
to which the CEO can envision multiple forms of action. More diverse TMTs tend
to exhibit more cognitive diversity (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996), which means
that more alternative ideas and views are voiced. In most firms, the TMT plays an
important role in major decisions that cannot be taken by the CEO alone. The greater
the number of alternative views and ideas that circulate in the boardroom, the more
unlikely it is that the CEO will be able to enforce all his/her own ideas. In other
words, diversity limits consensus (Knight et al. 1999). Hence, it can be assumed that
the greater the diversity in the TMT, the more it will act like a filter when it comes
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
Fig. 2 Stylized model of relationships
to the CEO imprinting values onto the corporation. The same logic should apply to
the relationship between the CEO and the strategy making process, and we would
therefore expect TMT diversity to have a similar effect as a limitation of managerial
discretion (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). In other words, we would expect it to
limit the extent to which a CEO can simply implement processes at will.
We have already argued that CEOs can project their values onto the organization in
their capacity as role models and thus also shape the organizational climate (Schein
2010). Yet the other members of the TMT are also likely to serve as role models.
Hence, greater diversity in the TMT is likely to mitigate the role model effect of the
CEO as the other TMT members (unknowingly) project different values onto the
organization. We thus expect TMT diversity to moderate both of the ways in which
CEO values influence strategy making processes, namely the intentional design of
processes according to desired end-states and the unwitting projection of values.
This leads us to the following hypothesis.
H5: Higher TMT diversity negatively moderates the relationship between CEO
values and the characteristics of the strategy making process
Our five hypotheses are summarized in Fig. 2. As this graphic shows, higher
levels of self-transcendence values should have an effect on (de-)centralization and
formalization, openness to change values should have an effect on (de-)centraliza-
tion, flexibility and external openness, while TMT diversity is expected to moderate
all of these relationships.
3 Methodology
Strategy making processes are usually studied by means of observation or by ask-
ing key players directly (Chakravarthy and Doz 1992). Since we wanted to show
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a general link between the characteristics of strategy making processes and personal
values, we needed a large sample. We therefore opted for the latter approach using
a large-scale survey. Our sample selection was guided by the concern that strategy
making quickly becomes simplistic below a certain firm size threshold (Kraus et al.
2006). For this reason, our sample was limited to the top corporations (measured by
turnover) in Germany and Austria for which CEO data could be obtained. Overall,
this sample included some 3000 firms. To test our hypotheses, a multi-item ques-
tionnaire was developed (in German). This questionnaire was extensively pre-tested
with top executives in two-hour face-to-face interviews and refined accordingly. We
also carried out a pre-test under normal survey conditions (i. e. in which the CEOs
completed the questionnaire alone) with CEOs from firms that were not included in
our sample. The improved questionnaire was then mailed to the CEOs of the 3000
companies in the sample. A total of 137 completed surveys were returned. This
translates into a response rate of 4.6%, which—while rather low—is acceptable for
CEO studies (Friedman and Singh 1989; Agle et al. 1999). Since the questionnaires
were personalized, we were able to match the responses with data from publicly
available sources and the corresponding corporate websites. Given our fairly low
response rate, non-response bias could have been a potential threat to the validity
and reliability of our findings. We tested for non-response bias by comparing the
responses of very early and very late respondents. This technique is based on the
assumption that respondents who only reply after the original deadline and after
multiple reminders are most similar to non-respondents (Wagner and Kemmerling
2010). We ran t-tests for all our major variables to test for significant differences
in the responses of early (first quartile) and late respondents (fourth quartile). No
statistically significant differences between early and late participants, either in our
dependent, independent or control variables, could be identified in any of the cases.
We do acknowledge, however, that our relatively small sample size and the rather
large variance in firm sizes might be a potential obstacle for the generalizability of
our results as we cannot convincingly argue that our sample is representative for
the population to a sufficient degree. For this reason, we used turnover as a control
variable in our models and did not find any significant effect (see below for details).
This suggests that the spread in firm sizes is not likely to bias our results.
As in every survey, common method bias (or common method variance, CMV)
can severely limit the validity of the findings. To avoid this methodological flaw, we
relied on two remedies as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003). First, we ensured
that the sequence of items minimized the likelihood of CMV. Introductory texts
were also used to create an additional psychological separation between predictor
and criterion variables. Second, we identified a second member of the TMT in each
participating firm and sent out a follow-up survey five months after the initial survey
to measure the dependent variables (i. e. the characteristics of the strategy making
process). There were no particular reasons for this time lag other than the need to
analyze the data from the prime respondent prior to contacting the second informant
and the time it took to get the replies. Data from top executives is notoriously hard
to obtain, and we invested a great deal of effort in ensuring a high response rate,
including sending multiple reminder e-mails and phoning the potential participants
to encourage them to participate. We received a total of 48 responses to our follow-
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up survey, which corresponds to a response rate of 35%. Of these, 44 responses
were usable for the analysis. We used the data generated thereby to validate the
dependent variables of the prime respondents and to check for potential differences
in results when the dependent variable from the validation survey was used instead
of that from the primary survey.
4 Analysis
Our dependent variables are the different characteristics of the strategy making
process. To construct the predictors, we took existing surveys of similar dimensions
by Hart (1992) and Andersen (2004) as our starting point, included a minimum of
two items on each characteristic and operationalized them using seven-point Likert
scales. Variables were constructed by calculating the adjusted mean of the respective
items from the questionnaire. We ran a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to ensure
validity and reliability for the four dimensions used to characterize the strategy
making process. We obtained a good model fit with an RMSEA of 0.062 and a CFI
of 0.935. Most items load on the predicted factor with a (standardized) value of
around 0.8, with only a few items exhibiting values slightly below 0.6. Full details
of the CFA are available from the authors upon request. A list of items for the
constructs and their origins in literature is shown in Table 1. Alphas are provided in
Table 2.
Table 1 Model constructs for characterization of the strategy process
Construct Questionnaire items Derived from
Decentralization Participation of middle managers Andersen (2004), Dess et al. (1997)
Participation of operative personnel Andersen (2004), Dess et al. (1997)
Formalization Process regularity Hart et al. (1994), Dess et al. (1997)
Emphasis on analytics in strategy making
process
Hart et al. (1994)
Emphasis on strategic medium- to long-
term planning
Andersen (2004)
Existence of a distinct strategy department Papadakis et al. (1998)
Flexibility Adaptation of tools according to specific
needs
Hart et al. (1994)
Challenging routines and assumptions when
environment changes
Hannan and Freeman (1984), Sharf-
man and Dean (1997)
Presence of strategies which emerged with-
out being planned
Dess et al. (1997), Mintzberg (1978)
Risk aversion in selection of strategic op-
tions
Hart et al. (1994), Dess et al. (1997)
Failure culture Hart et al. (1994), Dess et al. (1997)
External
openness
Stakeholder engagement (2 items) Freeman et al. (2010)
Stakeholder participation/open strategy
(2 items)
Laursen and Salter (2006), Dess et al.
(1997)
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Our main independent variables are the CEO values, which were assessed ac-
cording to the Schwartz Values Theory using the German translation of the Short
Schwartz Value Scale (Boar 2013; Lindeman and Verkasalo 2005).
The two variables used in the analysis are the two highest-order variables, namely
openness to change and self-transcendence (see above), which we obtained by aggre-
gating the lower-order values into the respective higher-order values according the
suggested methodology (Schwartz 1992). The variables are continuous, and a higher
value for each means that the value system of the respective CEO is geared more
towards this dimension than its counterpart on the respective axis (i. e. conservation
and self-enhancement). We then needed a measure for TMT diversity. As already in-
dicated, we used a “variety” based definition of diversity, which is arguably the most
common one (Nielsen 2010). Recent advances in upper echelon theory have em-
phasized the importance of measuring diversity along multiple dimensions. We paid
tribute to this insight and included functional background, social and geographical
background, educational background and age as the basis for our measure (Nielsen
2010). It has also been suggested that it can be beneficial for empirical studies to
study the single elements of TMT diversity separately (Williams and O’Reilly 1998).
However, since we only use TMT diversity as a moderator, and not as prime pre-
dictor, we knowingly sacrificed construct validity for higher measurement reliability
and ease of use (Nielsen 2010). Accordingly, we operationalized TMT diversity as
a single construct in the analysis. This approach has generally found acceptance
among researchers and practitioners (Jackson et al. 2003). Components were neither
centered nor standardized because, as argued by Dawson (2014), the results would
be the same regardless of standardization or not. We also conducted simple slope
tests to test the significance of our moderation. While these suggest significance,
their results have to be interpreted with caution given the arbitrary nature of the
values chosen to conduct the tests (Dawson 2014).
Since it has been argued that firm size and complexity could be related to various
aspects of strategy making and affect the relationship between personal character-
istics of the management and organizational outcomes (Miller 1991), we included
firm size by turnover and internationalization, measured on a three-point scale, as
control variables. Both variables were derived from secondary, publicly available
sources. Since the corporation’s (industry) environment could also affect its strategy
making process (Carpenter 2002), we also included environmental turbulence as
an additional control variable. The relevant variables and their descriptive statistics
are presented in Table 2. While the alphas for most variables are in an acceptable
range, the alpha for decentralization is rather low, which casts some doubts over
the assumption that our characterization of decentralization really does measure one
construct. We will return to this point below in the discussion section. However, we
would also like to offer another explanation for the rather low alpha levels. For the
purposes of brevity in the questionnaire (which is essential to obtain replies from
busy CEOs), we had to limit the number of items used to measure each variable.
To measure CEO values, for example, we used the shortest tested scale available,
with only 10 items (while scales with up to 57 items do exist, these are mostly used
with students, who are far easier to persuade to complete lengthy questionnaires).
An approach with only a few items per construct increases response rates, but leads
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by default to lower alphas, although this does not necessarily imply lower reliability
(Field 2013).
To test our hypotheses, we ran a set of moderated OLS regressions. For each
individual characteristic of the strategy making process, we ran a model with the
respective characteristic (e. g. formalization) as the dependent variable and CEO
values and TMT diversity as our independent variables. If a certain type of CEO
values is associated with the respective strategy making process characteristic, we
would expect the coefficient on the respective CEO value to be positive. To account
for the hypothesized interaction effect between CEO values and TMT diversity, we
included two moderation variables, which we obtained by multiplying the respective
variables. Our independent variables also included the other characteristics of the
strategy making process as controls to account for possible interaction effects which
did not explicitly form part of the model. For each regression model, we began with
the control variables only, then added the direct effects and finally the moderation
variables. We also ran a model for each specification without the control variables,
as this allowed us to run the model on a higher number of observations, since the
control variables, especially turnover, could not be determined for all firms in the
sample. Finally, we ran additional tests to check for potential endogeneity through
omitted variable bias and for possible common method bias. We approached the
former with a sub-sample analysis using only family firms with owner-CEOs, where
reverse causality is extremely unlikely as CEO self-selection is not an option. In the
latter, we used data obtained through our follow-up survey (see above). In doing so,
we fully separated the observations for the independent and dependent variables and
re-ran our analyses to confirm our results.
5 Results
We had hypothesized that the value orientation of the CEO would influence the
characteristics of the corporate strategy making process, but that this effect would
be negatively moderated by TMT diversity. Specifically, we argued that CEO values
geared towards openness to change would be positively associated with decentral-
ization (H1a), flexibility (H3) and external openness (H4), while CEO values geared
towards self-transcendence would be associated with higher levels of decentraliza-
tion (H1b) and formalization (H2). TMT diversity should moderate all of these
associations (H5).
The analysis partly supports our hypotheses. First, we see no connection between
CEO values and the highest-order characteristic of the strategy making process,
decentralization (see Table 3, hypotheses in bold). The signs for the coefficients are
correct in some of the model specifications, but the standard errors are far too high
to infer meaningful conclusions. This holds for both the values we had hypothesized
to be relevant for decentralization and is the same in all models. We thus cannot
reject the null hypothesis in H1a and H1b and have to conclude that there does not
seem to be a direct association between CEO values and the level of decentralization
in the strategy making process. We have endeavored to provide an explanation for
this result in the discussion section.
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When we go a level lower, however, the analysis provides support for our hy-
potheses. As hypothesized, our data shows that CEO values geared towards self-
transcendence are indeed associated with higher levels of formalization (H2; see Ta-
ble 4). The coefficient on self-transcendence is positive and statistically significant at
least at the 5% level (p-value <0.5) in all model specifications. In models 2 and 4, the
association is even significant at the 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. As expected,
the coefficient of the self-transcendence*TMT diversity variable is negative and sig-
nificant at the 10% level in the models where it is included, thereby supporting our
hypothesis (H5) that higher TMT diversity negatively moderates the relationship
between the CEO’s personal values and the characteristics of the strategy process.
The model fit is acceptable and highest in the model that includes the controls and
the moderation variables. Two other results are also worth mentioning. First, we
see a positive association between level of internationalization and formalization
(significant at the 10% level). Since governing the more complex structures of in-
ternational corporations requires more formal rules (Sanders and Carpenter 1998),
this is an intuitive result. Second, the models show a positive association between
formalization and flexibility, once again suggesting that the two characteristics are
not independent of each other.
The data also supports our hypothesis that values geared towards openness to
change are associated with more flexible types of strategy making processes (H3;
see Table 5). The coefficient on openness to change is positive but not significant in
model 2, yet as soon as the moderation variables are included, it becomes statistically
significant at the 10% level in model 3 and rising to the 5% level in model 4,
where we ran the regression without the controls in order to be able to use the
larger sample size available. The coefficient on the moderation variable openness to
change*TMT diversity is negative and significant in all models where it is included
(10% and 5% significance level), lending support to our moderation hypothesis. In
all the specifications, TMT diversity itself is also positively related to flexibility as
theory suggests (Boeker 1997). Depending on the model, we also see significant
positive associations between external openness and flexibility as well as between
formalization and flexibility, both of which we had expected from theory. Model fit
is even better than in the formalization model and, all in all, the regression model
provides some support for our hypotheses regarding the flexibility dimension of the
strategy making process (H3) and moderation (H5).
The results for external openness (Table 6) seem puzzling at first, as the data con-
tradicts our hypothesis that CEO values geared towards openness to change would be
associated with higher levels of external openness (H4). Indeed, the opposite would
seem to be the case. The analysis shows a statistically significant but negative asso-
ciation between higher levels of openness to change and external openness. Higher
levels of TMT diversity again moderate the relationship (statistically significant at
the 10%/5% levels depending on the model) and lower the negative association
(H5). The results point in the same direction in all model specifications and imply
that the less open a CEO is to change (i. e. the more conservationist a CEO is), the
more stakeholders are included. This result not only contradicts our hypothesis, it is
also intuitively puzzling, as it would seem logical to assume that stakeholder inte-
gration would lead to more alternative options and would thus be favored by a non-
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
Ta
bl
e
4
Re
su
lts
fo
r
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
w
ith
fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
as
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
M
od
el
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
1
2
3
4
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
(In
ter
ce
pt)
3.
96
40
0.
53
60
**
*
0.
60
81
0.
98
03
–
0.
35
94
1.
23
30
–
0.
62
81
1.
12
33
En
v
iro
nm
en
ta
lt
u
rb
u
le
nc
e
0.
03
30
0.
10
02
0.
00
37
0.
09
29
–
0.
01
54
0.
09
39
–
–
In
te
rn
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n
0.
41
00
0.
17
73
*
0.
33
05
0.
16
96
0.
30
46
0.
17
03
–
–
Tu
rn
o
v
er
0.
01
64
0.
01
84
0.
01
46
0.
01
66
0.
01
38
0.
01
65
–
–
O
pe
nn
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
–
–
0.
12
67
0.
12
28
–
0.
24
91
0.
62
07
0.
14
83
0.
51
90
Se
lf-
tr
an
sc
en
de
nc
e
–
–
0.
33
90
0.
09
94
**
*
1.
28
60
0.
53
98
*
1.
32
69
0.
48
50
**
TM
T
di
v
er
sit
y
–
–
0.
11
22
0.
32
67
0.
45
64
0.
42
52
0.
44
89
0.
40
18
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
–
–
0.
35
65
0.
20
12
0.
41
84
0.
20
35
*
0.
58
89
0.
17
99
**
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
06
69
0.
12
13
0.
05
95
0.
12
13
0.
08
01
0.
10
83
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
–
–
0.
23
24
0.
13
93
0.
21
15
0.
14
18
0.
14
97
0.
11
97
Se
lf-
tr
an
sc
en
de
nc
e*
TM
T
di
v
–
–
–
–
–
0.
36
00
0.
20
24
–
0.
37
80
0.
18
38
*
O
pe
nn
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
*T
M
T
di
v
–
–
–
–
0.
15
81
0.
24
87
–
0.
04
07
0.
20
32
A
dj
R
2
0.
03
95
0.
24
27
0.
25
46
0.
23
20
F-
st
at
ist
ic
s
2.
38
4.
63
*
*
*
3.
79
*
*
*
5.
15
*
*
*
N
10
2
10
2
10
2
12
7
Si
gn
if.
co
de
s:
0
‘
*
*
*
’
0.
00
1
‘
*
*
’
0.
01
‘
*
’
0.
05
‘
.
’
0.
1
‘
’
1
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
Ta
bl
e
5
Re
su
lts
fo
r
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
w
ith
fle
x
ib
ili
ty
as
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
M
od
el
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
1
2
3
4
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
(In
ter
ce
pt)
3.
90
80
0.
28
18
**
*
1.
01
60
0.
48
78
*
1.
21
60
0.
59
93
*
1.
47
85
0.
52
56
**
En
v
iro
nm
en
ta
lt
u
rb
u
le
nc
e
0.
07
71
0.
05
27
0.
06
22
0.
04
53
0.
06
26
0.
04
54
–
–
In
te
rn
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n
0.
14
22
0.
09
38
0.
12
51
0.
08
39
0.
13
62
0.
08
29
–
–
Tu
rn
o
v
er
0.
00
10
0.
00
96
–
0.
00
25
0.
00
81
–
0.
00
17
0.
00
80
–
–
O
pe
n
n
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
–
–
0.
01
99
0.
06
12
0.
50
20
0.
29
76
0.
50
30
0.
24
34
*
Se
lf-
tra
ns
ce
n
de
nc
e
–
–
–
0.
00
17
0.
05
19
–
0.
43
98
0.
26
63
–
0.
32
94
0.
23
50
TM
T
di
v
er
sit
y
–
–
0.
74
72
0.
14
07
**
*
0.
62
33
0.
19
70
**
0.
65
08
0.
18
20
**
*
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
06
33
0.
05
10
0.
07
80
0.
05
07
0.
11
87
0.
04
23
**
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
07
27
0.
05
95
0.
07
77
0.
05
88
0.
06
96
0.
05
13
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
–
–
0.
10
60
0.
06
83
0.
12
11
0.
06
84
0.
11
13
0.
05
62
Se
lf-
tra
ns
ce
n
de
nc
e*
TM
T
di
v
–
–
–
–
0.
16
31
0.
09
85
0.
11
12
0.
08
80
O
pe
n
n
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
*T
M
T
di
v
–
–
–
–
–
0.
19
97
0.
11
91
–
0.
19
28
0.
09
50
*
A
dj
R
2
0.
01
58
0.
32
39
0.
34
82
0.
35
22
F-
st
at
ist
ic
s
1.
53
2.
69
*
*
2.
23
*
2.
22
N
10
2
10
2
10
2
12
7
Si
gn
if.
co
de
s:
0
‘
*
*
*
’
0.
00
1
‘
*
*
’
0.
01
‘
*
’
0.
05
‘
.
’
0.
1
‘
’
1
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
Ta
bl
e
6
Re
su
lts
fo
r
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
w
ith
ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
as
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
M
od
el
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
1
2
3
4
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
(In
ter
ce
pt)
3.
40
10
0.
37
37
**
*
1.
28
60
0.
71
17
1.
85
00
0.
88
48
*
2.
19
02
0.
83
55
**
En
v
iro
nm
en
ta
lt
u
rb
u
le
nc
e
0.
10
56
0.
06
98
0.
09
11
0.
06
78
0.
10
52
0.
06
81
–
–
In
te
rn
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n
–
0.
28
96
0.
12
36
*
–
0.
40
17
0.
12
05
**
–
0.
41
78
0.
11
94
**
*
–
–
Tu
rn
o
v
er
0.
00
62
0.
01
28
0.
00
56
0.
01
22
0.
00
38
0.
01
21
–
–
O
pe
n
n
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
–
–
–
0.
01
45
0.
09
11
–
0.
90
21
0.
44
63
*
–
0.
71
99
0.
39
12
Se
lf-
tra
ns
ce
n
de
nc
e
–
–
0.
05
18
0.
07
76
0.
00
55
0.
40
88
0.
05
49
0.
38
22
TM
T
di
v
er
sit
y
–
–
–
0.
08
86
0.
24
08
–
0.
31
43
0.
31
25
–
0.
32
64
0.
30
72
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
12
63
0.
07
57
0.
11
41
0.
07
65
0.
08
74
0.
06
99
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
23
74
0.
14
88
0.
26
98
0.
15
02
0.
26
86
0.
14
14
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
–
–
0.
15
72
0.
08
81
0.
12
78
0.
08
82
0.
11
05
0.
08
23
Se
lf-
tra
ns
ce
n
de
nc
e*
TM
T
di
v
–
–
–
–
0.
02
09
0.
15
12
–
0.
00
09
0.
14
30
O
pe
n
n
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
*T
M
T
di
v
–
–
–
–
0.
36
28
0.
17
90
*
0.
26
56
0.
15
33
A
dj
R
2
0.
05
09
0.
16
30
0.
18
24
0.
08
04
F-
st
at
ist
ic
s
2.
80
*
3.
19
*
*
3.
05
*
*
2.
38
*
N
10
2
10
2
10
2
12
7
Si
gn
if.
co
de
s:
0
‘
*
*
*
’
0.
00
1
‘
*
*
’
0.
01
‘
*
’
0.
05
‘
.
’
0.
1
‘
’
1
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
conservationist mindset. There is, however, an alternative explanation for this result,
which we will look at in the discussion section below. Depending on the model,
we also see positive and statistically significant associations between formalization,
decentralization or flexibility and external openness. We also see a negative and sig-
nificant association between internationalization and external openness, suggesting
that the more internationally a corporation operates, the less likely it is to include
many external stakeholders. One reason for this might be that such firms need to pay
attention to the different stakeholders in each country in which they operate, who
might not always share the same interests (Agle et al. 1999). These stakeholders
cannot then assume a prominent role in the development of the central corporate
strategy, which might well lead to relatively few of them being considered or actively
involved on this aggregate level.
In short, the data provides support for our main hypotheses H2 and H3 as well
as general support for our moderation hypothesis H5. We do not find support for
hypotheses H1 and H4. We do, however, see support for an alternative (opposite)
formulation of hypothesis H4. As outlined above, we tested extensively for common
method bias and reverse causality and could not find significant differences in the
overall results between our original specifications and the various tests conducted.
This suggests that our results are neither driven by common method bias nor by
reverse causality. Details of the full validation analysis can be found in the Appendix.
6 Discussion and Implication of Findings
This paper studies the effects of CEO personal values on the characteristics of cor-
porate strategy making processes and suggests a model by which this association
is moderated by TMT diversity. The model was developed on the basis of exist-
ing strategy making process models, which we enhanced with selected additions.
We then tested the model using a large-scale survey. We analyzed the data using
moderated OLS regressions and found some support for our model, despite a few
surprising results (which we will expand upon later in this section). By integrat-
ing perspectives from upper echelon theory, values literature and strategy process
research, we provide the following contributions to the literature.
First, our model does not use performance as an outcome variable, but instead
uses a more proximal variable, namely the strategy making process. Many authors
have argued that the inconclusive results of past upper echelon research are due
in part to a focus on outcomes that are both too distal from personality factors
(Wowak et al. 2016) and lack the mediating effects of process variables (Miller
et al. 1998). We respond to this criticism and relate leadership characteristics to
the strategy making process. In our model, we do see an association between these
leadership characteristics and the proximal outcome variable. While this association
is not overly strong (see limitations section), our findings still support the notion
mentioned above and highlight the importance of CEOs for their corporations—an
aspect which might be masked by studying too distal an outcome variable. Indeed,
recent research by Quigley and Hambrick (2015) even suggests that the CEO effect
on corporations has increased over the years.
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Second, we propose a model for characterizing strategy making processes that
takes account of recent developments like open strategy (Whittington et al. 2011),
which had not yet been around when some of the more popular strategy making
frameworks (e. g. Hart 1992) were developed. So, while we do not develop an
entirely new classification, we still enrich existing frameworks by including open
strategy aspects in our assessment. Given the recent growing engagement of many
firms with openness initiatives and the increasing attention that open strategy has
been receiving from academia, we believe that the inclusion of this dimension is
crucial in grasping the fullness of corporate strategy making processes (Tavakoli
et al. 2015). While our research only touches the surface of the topic of open
strategy, we expect to see a lot more studies in this field in the near future. We also
hope that our integrative framework might be of help to researchers looking to study
open strategy in detail alongside other strategy making process characteristics.
Third, our research treats CEO values explicitly instead of inferring them from
demographic characteristics. It thus follows Boal and Hooijberg (2001), who call for
a stop in the use of demographic variables for deducing psychosocial constructs. We
believe that treating values explicitly not only provides more accurate explanations
of CEO effects, but is of even greater importance now, given the multiple demands
placed upon corporate leaders in times when profit maximization is decreasingly
seen as the sole purpose of a firm (Carter and Greer 2013).
Fourth, we provide a fuller model for understanding the link between corporate
leadership and firm outcomes. The hypothesized moderation effect of TMT diversity,
which our data generally supports, is of particular importance because it explicitly
addresses the interaction between the CEO and the TMT, thereby allowing a better
understanding of the link between corporate leadership and strategy making. Upper
echelon theory has a long history of debating the pros and cons of heterogeneity and
diversity within leadership teams. It has for example been argued that greater diver-
sity enhances a team’s ability to deal with complexity, but also limits its effectiveness
in execution (Carpenter et al. 2004). Our results do not easily lend themselves to
interpretations of whether TMT diversity is “good” or “bad”, as such an assessment
would, in our case, first require an assessment of whether CEO values should be
reflected in corporate strategy making processes. Arguably, this again depends on
the competitive situation of the corporation. Our findings do, however, add to a nu-
anced treatment of TMT diversity. They are also in line with authors who suggest
that, despite its advantages, TMT diversity is not universally beneficial (Ling and
Kellermanns 2010), or that, at least, high levels of TMT diversity in an organization
need to be dealt with efficiently (Miller et al. 1998). Future studies could focus
on these aspects, thereby leveraging our tentative results and further boosting their
relevance, particularly for practitioners.
Returning to the detailed results of our study, the first striking insight is that
the data supports the suggested model for lower-level characteristics of corporate
strategy making processes (e. g. formalization and flexibility), yet not for the highest-
level-characteristic (i. e. (de-)centralization). While this might at first glance seem
to call the entire model into question, there are in fact several possible explanations
for this.
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First, (de-)centralization is a key feature of organizational architecture (Lewin and
Stephens 1994), and this particular aspect of strategy making is often largely a result
of this overall architecture, which is sticky and very hard to change. Hence, CEOs
might not even be in a position to alter it in line with their personal preferences and
values, particularly in large corporations like those we studied (Vickery et al. 1999;
Miller and Droege 1986). If our study had focused on start-ups or very young firms,
the result might have been a different one.
Second, it can be argued that even if CEOs have the discretion to alter the level
of (de-)centralization in strategy making, their own values are less likely to play
a role, as practical aspects will tend to dominate. Indeed, for achievement oriented
executives, Lewin and Stephens (1994, p. 191) note that they would expect the
organizational design to “[...] be chosen on the basis of pragmatism, especially the
CEO’s perception of effectiveness.” We would, for example, expect target customer
groups (B2B vs. B2C), the type of products offered (standardized products vs.
customized services) or the level of competition in an industry to play a much more
profound role in the choice of the level of (de-)centralization (Vickery et al. 1999;
Bloom et al. 2010). Following this line of thought, we should find that values only
play a role for decentralization within samples of very similar firms in the same
industries, size cluster, etc. While our dataset unfortunately does not permit such
an investigation, future research could take this as a starting point and investigate
the effect of personal values on decentralization of strategy making within certain
groups of corporations.
Another possible explanation for the null result with regard to decentralization
could be our decentralization construct. The reported alpha of 0.47 implies rather
low reliability. In fact, it could be that decentralization with regard to strategy mak-
ing cannot easily be subsumed under one simple construct, since it is a multifaceted
concept that can manifest itself in various, not necessarily uniform, ways. Con-
ducting the analysis with specific aspects of decentralization, e. g. geographic or
hierarchical decentralization or decentralized decision authority vs. participation in
decisions (Andersen 2004), might thus produce results that are more in line with
our hypotheses. We hope to be able to explore this thought in future studies.
There are a few other findings in this paper that require further discussion. First,
we observed an unexpected result for external openness (i. e. a negative association
between openness to change values and external openness), which appears at first
glance to be counterintuitive and contradicts our hypothesis. Indeed, one would
expect a CEO with a stronger respect for openness to change to also promote
a strategy making process that is externally open, as this would imply that more
alternative options are being voiced and discussed. However, CEOs with a clearly
defined change agenda could also be afraid that too much external openness might act
as a slow-down mechanism and decelerate the pace of change (since many different
ideas and views have to be considered). Similar thoughts and ideas have been voiced
in relation to “optimal levels of stakeholder engagement”, where coordination and
dialog become increasingly costly after a certain point (Greenwood 2007).
An alternative explanation could be that, when it comes to strategy, external
stakeholders are not expected to provide a great deal of positive input to change.
In a forthcoming paper, Dobusch et al. (2015) compare open strategy to open inno-
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vation. They argue that while open innovation is very much about idea generation
and evaluation (for which modern tools such as online platforms are often used), the
purpose of open strategy is heavily focused on sensemaking. Sensemaking, how-
ever, is far less technology driven than idea generation and very often takes place
in a face-to-face setting. By necessity, doing this more complex inclusion process
“right” means spending more effort on each stakeholder and almost certainly work-
ing with a smaller number of stakeholders. Following this argument, the inclusion of
a higher number of external stakeholders does not necessarily accelerate or propel
change, and a non-conservationist CEO would not necessarily include more stake-
holders. We do, however, see these possible explanations as not entirely satisfactory
and thus feel that future research needs to investigate the link between CEO values
and external openness in greater depth.
Second, we would like to draw particular attention to the fact that our empirical
data does not show a (negative) association between openness to change values and
formalization, a result that supports the notion that formalization does not imply
corporate ossification. Quite the contrary, the fact that we do see a positive associ-
ation between formalization and flexibility in our models even supports the notion
that the two aspects of corporate strategy making are not rival, but mutually bene-
ficial, and that flexible strategy making processes actually need formal structures to
function well. Other authors have already shown such beneficial interaction (Baum
and Wally 2003), and some research has even suggested that these two aspects of
strategy making might well drive innovativeness together (Dibrell et al. 2014). While
our empirical results with regard to this particular aspect have to be interpreted with
caution, they nonetheless add to the aforementioned calls for a non-rival treatment of
flexibility and formalization. These calls, in turn, cannot be stressed enough, given
that the two are still popularly seen as conflicting attributes.
Overall, our results once again hint at the importance of the link between per-
sonality and strategy making. When it comes to practical relevance, they add to
previous findings that different leadership teams are better suited to delivering good
corporate performance depending on the circumstances (Haleblian and Finkelstein
1993), especially since it is to be expected that different strategy making styles will
function better or worse in different environments. Alternatively, CEOs looking to
alter their corporate strategy making process could take our results as a word of
caution and use them to prepare for opposing forces, e. g. when trying to include
a potentially diverse TMT in complex decisions and in the strategy making process
as a whole.
7 Limitations
As is the case for all research, there are limitations to our study. First, and despite
all our efforts to obtain a reasonable sample size, it proved very difficult to obtain
responses from CEOs. While our model, despite the small sample size, shows statis-
tically significant results, these have to be interpreted with caution, particularly with
regard to their generalizability. Second, we rely on self-reported personal values
and strategy making process characteristics. While we do address potential pitfalls
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
with a follow-up survey, studies with longitudinal or more observational research
designs (e. g. case studies) could add to and reinforce our results. That said, our
results are only built on data from the German-speaking world, since a multilingual
research design would have been far more complex and have brought with it poten-
tial interpretation problems (Behling and Law 2000). Nonetheless, we would like to
underline that this focus on a specific European setting is also a response to the calls
for more upper echelon research in non-US-settings, where studies have so far been
sparse. The links between leadership characteristics and various outcome variables
do have the potential to differ depending on the country, particularly as a result of
the different legal and governance systems. Our results show that a strong leadership
effect is also present in the German-speaking world. Nevertheless, it would be inter-
esting to replicate our findings in other cultures and geographic areas and to check
whether the identified moderation holds there as well. Future studies could go as far
as to use the approach taken by Crossland and Hambrick (2011) and compare the
robustness of the model across legal regimes and nations to determine the conditions
under which the CEO effect and/or moderation are stronger.
Whilst we believe that our focus on the strategy making process as an outcome
variable is beneficial, future work could still expand the model towards the perfor-
mance side and explore possible links between CEO values (and TMT diversity)
and corporate performance. Such an approach would, however, have to take care not
to put too much focus on too distal outcome variables.
Finally, more needs to be known about the actual micro-level processes that link
values to strategy making. While our research provides a generalized explanation of
how values manifest themselves in strategy making, we do not open the black box of
how the analyzed personality aspects actually influence strategy making in real-life
situations (Kisfalvi and Pitcher 2003). Future research could build on our findings
and take a deeper look at the mechanisms and actions of individuals by which the
outlined model functions in practice. A strategy-as-practice approach which made
use of case studies, observation and in-depth interviews with executives could, in
particular, shed light on the inner workings of the model and provide practice-ready
insights for corporate leaders.
8 Conclusion
Much work has been done on corporate strategy making processes, top management
teams and CEO values, but none of it has so far explicitly related the three. We
propose a model where CEO values have a direct influence on strategy making
processes, yet where this association is moderated by TMT diversity. Data collected
through a large-scale survey supports some of our hypotheses. We find effects of
CEO personal values on formalization, flexibility and external openness of strategy
making, but not on decentralization. Greater diversity in the TMT seems to lower the
effect of the CEO’s values on strategy making. Our findings add to upper echelon
theory and strategy process research and allow for a better understanding of the link
between corporate leadership and strategy making.
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Appendix
Validation—Sub-Sample Analysis
A potential drawback of any single survey study relates to potential endogeneity. It
could, for example, be the case that a third, unobserved factor drives the results, thus
leading to omitted variable bias. In the case of our study, total reverse causality seems
unlikely, as the characteristics of the strategy making process are unobservable to
outsiders. Yet it could be that CEOs self-select themselves into firms that they believe
to fit their own value systems (Berson et al. 2008). Alternatively, a corporation’s
owners or supervisory board could systematically seek out CEOs with value systems
that are an apparent fit with the characteristics of the corporation. Likewise, it could
indeed also be that CEO values are shaped in the long run by firm processes and
culture. Despite the fact that values are something enduring, they are also not fixed
and are thus subject to change and minor adaptations (Rokeach 1973).
In an ideal scenario, researchers would collect longitudinal data on strategy mak-
ing process characteristics and CEO values alike to explicitly isolate causality. Un-
fortunately, budgetary constraints prevented such a complex approach in our research
project. We did, however, apply an alternative approach to ensure that the results
were indeed driven by the hypothesized relationships. Many firms in Austria and
Germany are privately owned, with the owner(s) also running the corporation. In
such a setting, the causality is much more straightforward. First, selection bias is not
an issue as owner-managers do not choose the firm they work for and thus cannot
self-select. Also, it seems rather unlikely that the values of the owner of a firm will
be influenced by it. Hence, we ran the same analysis again with only family firms
whose owner(s) held executive positions in the firm. This approach heavily reduced
our sample size to 34 observations, leaving us with large standard errors. The results
obtained (see Table 7; tests for hypotheses shown in bold) do, however, show the
same signs on the relevant coefficients as in the original models, although some
of them do also lose their significance. While caution in the interpretation of these
results is certainly warranted, we nonetheless conclude it to be rather unlikely that
we are only observing a reversely causal relationship.
Validation—Follow-up Survey
As already outlined in the paper, common method bias (or common method vari-
ance/CMV) is a problem faced by all single-survey research designs. Accordingly,
we used multiple tactics to avoid this issue. The most sophisticated of these was the
use of data generated in our follow-up-survey, which was conducted with a second
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
Ta
bl
e
7
Re
su
lts
o
ft
he
re
gr
es
sio
n
w
ith
su
bs
am
pl
e-
da
ta
o
n
ly
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
(In
ter
ce
pt)
2.
02
48
2.
27
38
0.
52
68
1.
13
82
0.
13
64
1.
83
20
O
pe
nn
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
–
0.
89
46
1.
83
43
0.
45
70
0.
90
71
–
0.
94
57
1.
44
86
Se
lf-
tra
ns
ce
n
de
nc
e
1.
27
21
0.
99
20
–
0.
53
26
0.
49
55
0.
00
24
0.
81
29
TM
T
di
v
er
sit
y
–
0.
02
52
0.
71
82
0.
51
52
0.
33
94
0.
24
51
0.
56
72
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
18
36
0.
09
38
0.
19
74
0.
15
67
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
0.
75
02
0.
38
32
–
–
–
0.
25
90
0.
32
28
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
–
0.
25
80
0.
29
54
0.
24
43
0.
13
98
0.
33
72
0.
22
77
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
0.
31
42
0.
24
94
–
0.
10
09
0.
12
57
–
–
En
v
iro
nm
en
ta
l-t
ur
bu
le
nc
e
–
0.
16
17
0.
18
38
0.
15
12
0.
08
71
0.
19
73
0.
14
25
Se
lf
tr
an
sc
en
de
nc
e*
TM
T
di
v
–
0.
36
92
0.
34
11
0.
17
43
0.
16
91
0.
01
03
0.
27
69
O
pe
nn
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
*T
M
T
di
v
0.
36
69
0.
70
01
–
0.
12
63
0.
34
74
0.
44
99
0.
55
06
A
dj
R
2
0.
02
86
0.
29
87
0.
11
97
F-
st
at
ist
ic
s
1.
11
3.
02
*
1.
5
N
34
34
34
Si
gn
if.
co
de
s:
0
‘
*
*
*
’
0.
00
1
‘
*
*
’
0.
01
‘
*
’
0.
05
‘
.
’
0.
1
‘
’
1
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
Ta
bl
e
8
Re
su
lts
o
ft
he
re
gr
es
sio
n
w
ith
se
pa
ra
te
d
su
rv
ey
sf
or
de
pe
nd
en
ta
n
d
in
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
es
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
Es
tim
at
e
St
d.
er
ro
r
(In
ter
ce
pt)
–
0.
32
80
–
0.
32
80
2.
09
70
1.
08
06
–
0.
85
92
2.
61
59
O
pe
nn
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
–
0.
41
62
1.
00
81
0.
35
79
0.
64
69
–
2.
63
74
1.
42
50
Se
lf-
tra
ns
ce
n
de
nc
e
0.
67
58
0.
80
50
–
0.
91
34
0.
49
90
1.
80
28
1.
16
28
TM
T
di
v
er
sit
y
0.
43
17
0.
54
86
–
0.
25
57
0.
35
33
0.
70
80
0.
80
99
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n
–
–
0.
29
89
0.
09
77
**
0.
34
36
0.
30
35
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
0.
72
28
0.
23
61
**
–
–
0.
32
87
0.
39
05
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
0.
17
74
0.
20
67
0.
30
05
0.
12
41
*
–
–
Ex
te
rn
al
o
pe
nn
es
s
–
0.
05
60
0.
11
55
0.
06
21
0.
07
38
–
0.
12
26
0.
25
28
En
v
iro
nm
en
ta
lt
u
rb
u
le
nc
e
–
0.
00
16
0.
13
88
0.
11
91
0.
08
69
–
0.
08
27
0.
20
49
Se
lf
tr
an
sc
en
de
nc
e*
TM
T
di
v
–
0.
22
58
0.
28
82
0.
31
37
0.
17
91
–
0.
73
38
0.
41
13
O
pe
nn
es
s
to
ch
an
ge
*T
M
T
di
v
0.
21
42
0.
41
85
–
0.
19
25
0.
26
81
1.
20
91
0.
58
58
*
A
dj
R
2
0.
21
59
0.
39
41
0.
05
39
F-
st
at
ist
ic
s
2.
17
3.
51
*
*
1.
22
*
N
44
44
44
Si
gn
if.
co
de
s:
0
‘
*
*
*
’
0.
00
1
‘
*
*
’
0.
01
‘
*
’
0.
05
‘
.
’
0.
1
‘
’
1
K
Schmalenbach Bus Rev
respondent in each firm five months after the original survey. The only reasons for
this time lag were the need to analyze the data from the prime respondent prior to
contacting the second informant and the time it took to get the replies. We do not
expect the time lag to have affected the data obtained, as it seems unlikely that the
characteristics of a corporation’s strategy making process would change within this
rather short time window.
The data obtained through this follow-up survey enabled us to fully separate
the observations for dependent and independent variables. Hence, we re-ran our
models with the dependent variables (characteristics of the strategy process) from
the follow-up survey and the independent variables (values, TMT diversity, etc.)
from the primary survey. We used the other characteristics of the strategy process as
control variables in this case as well, but stuck here of course to the data generated in
the follow-up survey for purposes of consistency. The results are presented in Table 8
(tests for hypotheses in bold) and do not show any statistically significant differences
to the main analysis. In the formalization and flexibility models, while we see correct
signs on the relevant coefficients, the effects are non-significant, which is arguably
due to the much smaller sample size. For external openness, we observe the correct
sign on the coefficient, and the result is even significant at the 10% level (despite
the low sample size). In all of the above models, the moderation variable coefficient,
with higher levels of TMT diversity lowering the association between CEO values
and the strategy making process, has the correct sign. For external openness, the
moderation of openness to change is also statistically significant despite the lower
sample size. In short, the results from our validation analysis using the data from the
follow-up survey do not contradict our original analysis, and we therefore conclude
it to be rather unlikely that a systematic common method bias is driving our results.
Schwartz Value Definitions and Items (Schwartz 1994)
Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to
social standards.
Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom
one is in frequent personal contact.
Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or
harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
Hedonism: pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.
Power: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and
resources
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of
self.
Self-direction: independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring.
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
Tradition: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that
traditional culture or religion provide
Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the wel-
fare of all people and for nature.
K
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